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RECENT CASES
CORPORATIONS-ACTION BY ASSIGNEE. The plaintiff, as assignee of a
foreign corporation, brought an action on an account stated. Held: The
assignee could not maintain an action where the foreign corporation, because of its noncompliance with the laws of the state, could not maintain
the action. Association Collectors v. Hardman, 102 Wash. Dec. 354, 98 P.
(2d) 318 (1940).
The controlling statute, which was formerly REv. REV. STAT. § 3842
and is now REM. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 3836-12, provides that no corporation should be permitted to commence or maintain any suit in any
court in this state without alleging and proving that it has paid its annual
license fee.
In holding that the failure of the assignor corporation to pay its annual
license fee and to file its articles of incorporation bars the assignee's action,
the result is in accord with the holdings of most jurisdictions. Hogan v.
Intertype Corporation, 136 Ark. 52, 206 S. W. 58 (1918); Lewis v. Club
Realty Co., 264 Mass. 588, 163 N. E. 172 (1928); Flinn v. Gillen, 320 Mo.
1047, 10 S. W. (2d) 923 (1928); Halsey v. Henry Jewett Dramatic Co., 190
N. Y. 231, 83 N. E. 25 (1907), 123 Am. St. Rep. 548 (1909); Kinney v. Reid
Ice-Cream Co., 57 App. Div. 206, 68 N. Y. Supp. 325 (2d. Dep't 1901).
Usually the holdings are based upon two grounds: the principle that the
assignee of a non-negotiable chose in action takes it subject to all defenses which the obligor may have had against the assignor; and that the
opposite result would permit noncomplying corporations to render nugatory the statutes preventing them from suing, by the simple expedient
of assignment.
The plaintiff relied upon two prior Washington cases, Pacific Drug Co.
v. Hamilton, 71 Wash. 469, 128 Pac. 1069 (1913), and Marshall v. Pike, 145
Wash. 348, 260 Pac. 531 (1927), in each of which the assignee was allowed
to maintain an action which could not have been maintained by the
assignor corporation because of non-payment of its annual license fee.
In the Pacific case, supra, the court cited no authority but said that proof
of the assignment obviated the necessity of inquiring into the capacity of
the assignor to sue, since the assignor was not suing. In the Marshall case,
supra, the court based its decision upon the Pacific case alone.
The majority of the court in the principal case distinguished it from
these two prior holdings on the ground that in the earlier cases, the
assignors were both domestic corporations and had complied with all
laws relating to their corporate status except that requiring payment
of their license fee while in the instant case, the assignor was a foreign
corporation and had failed to comply with any of the laws prerequisite
to the right of foreign corporations to engage in intrastate business. The
four dissenting judges held that the majority result could not be reached
without overruling the Pike and Hamilton cases, supra, as such distinction
in fact could make no difference in the result.
The dissent seems sound in this respect, as it is well settled that the
failure to pay the license fee alone, will prevent a corporationfrom suing
and this applies to a domestic as well as a foreign corporation. West Side
Telephone Co. v. Kenison, 147 Wash. 542, 266 Pac. 706 (1928). From the
general principle that "the assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor"
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the defense good against the domestic corporation should be good against
its assignee and there seems to be no reason why a domestic corporation
should be allowed to render nugatory the statute by means of an assignment. It is submitted that the instant case is sound and in line with most
authorities but that the Hamilton and Pike cases, supra, cannot be distinguished on principle, are unfortunate in result, and should have been
overruled.
R. R.
EVmENCE-SuBsEQUJENT EPAmS. The plaintiff's foot was crushed by, the
treadle of a foot-operated printing press maintained by the defendant
school district. Despite the defendant's admission in court that it was
practicable to guard such a treadle, the trial court permitted evidence of
a subsequent installation of a guard to go to the jury. On appeal, held,
affirmed, on the ground that an instruction had been given forbidding use
of such evidence on the issue of negligence and limiting it to the issue
of practicability of guarding the treadle. A dissenting justice pointed out
that, since the defendant had admitted it was practicable to guard the
treadle, there was no issue of practicability. Banks v. Seattle School District No. 1, 195 Wash. 321, 80 P. (2d) 835 (1938).
By the well-settled rule, evidence of precautions taken by a defendant
subsequent to an accident is to be excluded, because, the courts usually
say, it is not relevant to the question of the defendant's negligence as an
admission by conduct. Bell v. Washington Cedar Shingle Co., 8 Wash. 27,
35 Pac. 405 (1894). McCormick has suggested that the exclusionary rule
is actually one of privilege, not relevancy, and is designed to encourage
the taking of precautions after an accident-a social policy which justifies
keeping such facts from the jury, even though relevant. The Scope of
Privilege in the Law of Evidence (1938) 16 TEX. L. REv. 447, 459. But as
a privilege, McCormick points out, it is unique in that such evidence is not
excluded for all purposes. McCormick, supra, at 460. So, where the evidence of subsequent precautions is to be used otherwise than as an admission of negligence by the defendant, the exclusionary rule is subject
to exception, such evidence then being admitted accompanied by the
proper qualifying instruction. Carstens Packing Co. v. Swinney, 186 Fed.
50 (C. C. A. 9th, 1911). Evidence of subsequent installation of guards
to the injury-causing machine or apparatus to prove the practicability of
such guards is one such exception well established in Washington law.
Erickson v. McNeeley & Co., 41 Wash. 509, 84 Pac. 3 (1906); Thomson v.
Issaquah Shingle Co., 43 Wash. 253, 86 Pac. 588 (1906); Lindblom v. Hazel
Mill Co., 91 Wash. 333, 157 Pac. 998 (1916). In each of these cases an
employee of the defendant was injured by an unguarded saw and the
issue of practicability was clearly and definitely raised by the provisions
of the Factory Acts then in force relating to the employer's liability for
injuries from unguarded machines which might have been guarded. See
also Wheeler v. Portland-TacomaAuto Freight Co., 167 Wash. 218, 9 P.
(2d) 101 (1932).
In the Banks case, supra, it appears that no clear issue of practicability
was raised, either by the pleadings or the evidence. On the contrary, the
defendant admitted that it was practicable to guard the printing press.
Practically speaking, then, the jury's only possible use of the evidence of
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subsequent precaution would be on the forbidden issue of defendant's negligence, as an admission by conduct. Although ordinarily facts may be
proved even though admitted (Smith v. Seattle, 33 Wash. 481, 74 Pac. 674
(1903)) it would seem to be highly undesirable, when practicability of
taking precautions is admitted, to allow evidence of subsequent precautions to go to the jury, since, serving no useful purpose, such evidence is
subject only to misuse.
W. B. B.
MASTER

AND

SERVANT-WORKAIIEN'S

COMTPENSATION-COURSE

OF EAIPLOY-

Claimant, a laborer on the Grand Coulee Dam project, whose duties
were to pick up scrap material in and around the dam, had been told by
his foreman that before he could expect a raise in pay he would have
to "learn his way around a little better". During his lunch hour he went
down inside the dam to acquaint himself with the character of the construction, and while walking through a poorly lighted tunnel, fell down
a fifty-foot shaft, incurring serious injuries. Held: Complainant was not
injured "in the course of his employment" and could not recover under
the Workmen's Compensation Act (RE. REV. STAT. § 7673 et seq.) Young
v. Dep't of Labor and Industries, 100 Wash. Dec. 118, 93 P. (2d) 337 (1939).
MEN r.

Under the Washington statute as originally enacted (Wash. Laws 1911,
c. 74 § 5) it was enough to make the injury compensable that it occurred
while the employee was upon his employer's premises, the phrase "in
the course of his employment" applying only to injuries received while
away from the premises. But in 1927 the statute was amended (Wash.
Laws 1927, c. 310, § 4) to require that the injury occur in the course of
employment whether upon or away from the premises of the employer.
Although the compensation acts of most states require that the injury
be one "arising out of and in the course of employment", our act and those
of Pennsylvania (PuREN's PENN. STAT. (1936) Title 77, § 361), Texas (VERNON'S TEXAs STAT. (1936) art. 8306, § 1) and Utah (REV. STAT. OF UTAH (1933)
§ 42-1-43) do not require the causal connection between the employment
and the injury. All that the employee need show to recover under the
act is that he was injured while in the course of his employment. (See
REM. REV. STAT. § 7679.) Hence, it would seem that our act is an expression of a more liberal policy than that obtaining in most jurisdictions.
And our court has declared that the statute will be liberally construed
in favor of its beneficiaries. Hilding v. Dep't of Labor and Ind., 162 Wash.
168, 298 Pac. 321 (1931); Hill v. Dep't of Labor and Ind., 173 Wash. 575, 24
P. (2d) 95 (1933).
While there has been no previous case in this jurisdiction presenting
the question of injuries incurred during the noon hour, it is uniformly
recognized in states where the question has arisen that the mere fact that
the employee is not working at the time will not take him out of the course
of employment. HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 212; 71 C. J. 739. Rather, it has
been suggested that the freedom of action permitted to the employee is
much broader than during the working hours, so that an act which would
take him out of the course of employment if committed while he was on
the job would not necessarily do so if committed during the lunch period.
Brown, "Arising Out of and in the Course of the Employment" in Workmen's Compensation Laws (1932) 7 Wis. L. REv. 67, 81. In White v. Shafer
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Bros. Lumber & Door Co., 165 Wash. 298, 5 P. (2d) 520 (1931) wherein
REV. STAT.
defendant-employer pleaded the statute as a defense (REs.
§ 7673 provides that action under the statute shall be "to the exclusion
of every other remedy") the court held that a night worker who, by
arrangement with his employer, had come back to the plant during the day
to seek extra work, was within the course of his employment, saying,
. it is not necessary that any employee... must necessarily be actually
at work, when injured, in order to be considered as injured in the
course of his employment..."
The court recognized in the principal case that an employee might be
allowed to recover for injuries sustained during the noon hour, but quoted
from 71 C. J. 740 to the effect that "he is not compensable if the injury
resulted from an independent act of the employee, having no connection
with his work or his meal" However, this rule is based upon decisions
from jurisdictions wherein the statute requires a causal connection between the employment and the injury, and as is indicated in 71 C. J.
358, decisions of other jurisdictions should have little weight where the
wording of the statutes to which they relate is different from that of
the statute of the forum. Furthermore, decisions from some of these
jurisdictions reveal that even in instances of acts of horseplay, admittedly
having no connection with the employee's work, the courts will concede
that the injury occurred in the course of employment, denying recovery
only because it did not arise out of the employment. Coronado Beach Co.
v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 682, 158 Pac. 212, L. . A. 1916F 1164 (1916); Tarpper
v. Weston-Mott Co., 200 Mich. 275, 166 N. W. 857 (1918); Pierce v. BoyerVan Kuran Co., 99 Neb. 321, 156 N. W. 509, L. P. A. 1916D 970 (1916).
The more pertinent decisions construing compensation acts similar to
ours have found the employee within the course of his employment
where he has been injured while committing acts much more clearly
divorced from his work than was the act of the claimant in the Young case.
Hale v. Savage Fire Brick Co., 75 Pa. Super. 454 (1921) (fell over wall
while being chased by co-employees); Oldinsky v. P. & R. C. & I. Co., 92
Pa. Super 328 (1927) (jumped into coal chute to ride on conveyor); Petroleum Casualty Co. v. Green, 11 S. W. (2d) 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928)
(cranking co-employee's auto preparatory to leaving employer's premises); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Smith, 40 S. W. (2d) 913 (Tex. Civ. App.
1931) (riding motorcycle on way to work); Twin Peaks Canning Co. v.
Ind. Comm., 57 Utah 589, 196 Pac. 853 (1921) (tampering with elevator
controls as practical joke on co-employee). So far as any criterion is apparent in these decisions, it is not the connection between the act and the
employment, but is the possibility of the employer's reasonably foreseeing
the commission of the act by the employee.
While the decision in the Young case is not one which may be categorically labelled either right or wrong, it is submitted that, despite an
avowed policy of liberal construction, our court has given the Compensation Act a narrower construction than that given any similar act, and
that it has relied upon inapposite authority in doing so..
V. C.
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Claimant sought an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act (REmI.
REV. STAT. §§ 7673 to 7796-2) for permanent partial disability, predicating
his claim upon the combined effects of pre-existing tuberculosis, by reason
of which his right leg was six inches shorter than the left, and a present
injury to his left ankle. The Department award of fifteen degrees permanent partial disability was increased, on appeal to the Superior Court,
to forty degrees. Held: Judgment reversed. There was not enough evidence
to overcome the prima facie presumption, fixed by Rmw REv. STAT. § 7697,
that the Department's decision is correct. Furthermore, the facts did not
bring the case within the rule that if an injury lights up a latent infirmity
or weakened physical condition occasioned by disease, the resulting disability is to be attributed to the injury, and the court erred in granting
an award in excess of the amount allowed by the Act for disability to a
specific member. Reid v. Department of Labor & Industries, 101 Wash.
Dec. 372, 96 P. (2d) 492 (1939).
In the first case arising under our Act involving pre-existing disease,
although the question of extent of compensation was not in issue, the
court held that a ruptured appendix caused by pressure or a blow upon
an already diseased member was a compensable injury. Shadbolt v. Dept.,
121 Wash. 409, 209 Pac. 683 (1922); Clark v. Dept., 131 Wash. 256, 230
Pac. 133 (1924). And in two subsequent cases claims were allowed where
the only result of an extraordinary exertion in the course of employment
was to aggravate diseased heart and artery conditions. Frandila v. Dept.,
137 Wash. 530, 243 Pac. 5 (1926); Cole v. Dept., 137 Wash. 538, 243 Pac. 7
(1926).
Before the question of the amount of compensation recoverable in
such cases had been before the court, REm. Rsv. STAT § 7679 (g), was
amended (Wash. Laws 1927, c. 310, § 4) to provide that: "Should a workman receive an injury to a member or part of his body already from
*hatever cause permanently partially disabled, resulting in the amputation thereof or in an aggravation or increase in such permanent partial
disability but not resulting in permanent total disability . . . his compensation . . . shall be adjudged with regard to the previous disability
of the injured member or part and the degree or extent of the aggravation or increase of disability thereof."
Thereafter, the Act again was amended (Wash. Laws 1929, c. 132, § 2)
to provide, in what is now Rmw. REV. STAT § 7679 (1), that: "If ... an injured workman had, at the time of his injury, a pre-existing disease and
...
such disease delays or prevents complete recovery from such injury
the said department shall ascertain . . . the period over which the injury
would have caused disability were it not for the diseased condition and/or
the extent of permanent partial disability which the injury would have
caused were it not for the disease, and award compensation only therefor."
In the first case in which the 1929 amendment was considered, any
effect which it may have been intended to have on the rule of previous
cases was avoided by the holding that, under its provisions, "it is the
duty of the department to deduct for the effect of a pre-existing disease
upon an injury, and not deny any recovery . . . because of the effect of
the injury upon the disease." McArthur v. Dept., 168 Wash. 405, 21 P. (2d)
418 (1932). And in Hadley v. Dept., 174 Wash. 582, 25 P. (2d) 1031 (1933),
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the court said that the statute would apply only where the disease was
active and not where it was quiescent
In Metcalf v. Dept., 168 Wash. 305, 11 P. (2d) 821 (1932), and in subsequent decisions, Matela v. Dept., 174 Wash. 144, 24 P. (2d) 429 (1933);
Anderson v. Dept., 174 Wash. 702, 26 P. (2d) 77 (1933); Sweitzer v. Dept.,
177 Wash. 28, 30 P. (2d) 980, 34 P. (2d) 350 (1934); Ray v. Dept., 177 Wash.
687, 33 P. (2d) 375 (1934); Brittain v. Dept., 178 Wash. 499, 35 P. (2d) 49
(1934); McKinnie v. Dept., 179 Wash. 245, 37 P. (2d) 218 (1934); Smith v.
Dept., 179 Wash. 501, 38 P. (2d) 212 (1934); McGuire v. Dept., 179 Wash.
645, 38 P. (2d) 266 (1934); Johnson v. Dept., 184 Wash. 567, 52 P. (2d) 310
(1935); Pulver v. Dept., 185 Wash. 664, 56 P. (2d) 701 (1936), including the
Hadley and McArthur cases, compensation for disability occasioned by an
injury lighting up a latent disease was allowed without any consideration
of the 1927 amendment.
Finally, in Elliott v. Dept., 187 Wash. 656, 61 P. (2d) 291 (1936), the
court was presented with a situation wherein a workman claimed compensation for injury to a spine already weakened, not by latent disease,
but by a non-incapacitating physical malformation, and in that case the
1927 amendment was construed to give the Department discretion to
determine to what extent the disability was non-compensable because due
to the previous weakness and to what extent it was compensable because
due to the injury. Succeeding cases, involving pre-existing disease rather
than physical defects, followed and relied upon prior decisions without
mentioning the Elliott case. Daugherty v. Dept., 188 Wash. 626, 63 P. (2d)
434 (1936); Devlin v. Dept., 194 Wash. 549, 78 P. (2d) 952 (1938); Bergagna
v. Dept., 199 Wash. 263, 91 P. (2d) 551 (1939), (1939) 14 WAsx. L. Rev. 329.
In the very next case involving a physical defect, the construction
given to mEai.REV. STAT. § 7679 "(g) in the Elliott case was declared incorrect and the statute was construed to apply only in cases in which the
workman already is permanently partially disabled within the meaning
of the Act, by his pre-existing condition, and not in cases where the preexisting defect does not incapacitate him. Miller v. Dept., 200 Wash. 674,
94 P. (2d) 764 (1939). ("Permanent partial disability" is defined by Rmvm.
REv. STAT. § 7679 (f) to include any "injury known in surgery to be a
permanent partial disability.") Insofar as the decision in the" Reid case
is based on the finding that claimant had not brought himself within the
rule applicable to pre-existing infirmities it would appear to be consistent
with the holding in the 'Miller case, since claimant was quite clearly permanently partially disabled by his pre-existing condition.
It would seem, too, that the construction given to REM REV. STAT. § 7679
(g) is not inconsistent with the rule applied to cases 'of disease under
REm REv. STAT. § 7679 (1). In either situation the pre-existing defect will
not affect the amount recoverabler if it had no incapacitating effect prior
to the present injury, but if either the disease or the physicial infirmity
is disabling, the workman will recover only for the further disability occasioned by the injury.
This rule is in accordance with the prevailing view (71 C. J. § 361;
HAPER, ToRTs (1933) § 211) and would seem to represent the logical
application of -principles of legal causation. While it may be contended
that considerations of social policy require treatment of the Act as one for
industrial insurance and that compensation should be awarded solely on
the basis of extent of disability rather than cause of disability, it is
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apparent, in view of the statutes herein discussed, that such criticism must
V. C.
be addressed to the Legislature rather than to the Court.
NEw TRIAL-MIScoNDUCT OF JURORS-VERDICT BY LOT OR CHANCE. In an
action for damages because of the defendant's alleged appropriation of the
plaintiff's land, a 10 to 2 verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff. In
civil cases this tally is sufficient to sustain a verdict. REM. REV. STAT. § 358.
It appeared that the jury had been deadlocked at 9 to 3 for the plaintiff.
The judge was informed of the situation when he called in the jury to
ascertain their progress. He then advised them that he would give them
fifteen minutes more to deliberate. On returning to the jury room, the
three jurors who had been holding out for the defendant agreed that
the verdict should go for the plaintiff, but in order to see which one
would vote for him they cut cards, the high man to cast his ballot in that
direction. The defendant alleged that this constituted misconduct under
REM. REV. STAT. (SUP. 1939) § 399. "...; and whenever any one or more
of the jurors shall have been induced to assent to any general or special
verdict to a finding on any questions submitted to the jury by the court,
other and different from his own conclusions, and arrived at by a resort
to the determination of chance or lot, such misconduct may be proved
by affidavits of one or more jurors." Held: Verdict bad on the basis of the
statute. Vogt v. Curtis, 100 Wash. Dec. 606, 94 P. (2d) 761 (1939).
Did the "chance" affect the verdict? This conduct did not in any way
control the direction of the verdict. Its tenor had already been determined.
When the cards were cut, all twelve jurors agreed that plaintiff should
have the verdict. The device used by the three jurors was apparently used
for the mere purpose of making their prior conclusion effective, at the
same time operating as a "face-saving" procedure, two of them to continue to dissent. Under the circumstances, can it not be more plausibly
argued that the verdict was a valid 12 verdict rather than an invalid 10
verdict?
S. J. K.
REAL ESTATE BRoKERS-MISREPRESENTATION TO PURCHASERS. Respondent,
a real estate broker, called on appellants in response to their advertisement for sale or exchange of their ranch, and exhibited property listed
with him. Appellants investigated the property and had it appraised, but
were dissuaded from meeting the owner by respondent. Respondent falsely
stated his principal demanded $15,000, and the deal was made for $4,500
cash, assumption of a $5,000 mortgage, and $5,000 in real estate, a total
of $14,500. Respondent told appellants that farm property was not acceptable to his principal, and managed an indirect trade of appellants' ranch
for some city property (apparently non-existent) which was purportedly
to be given for his principal. The principal in fact asked only $8,500, and
received only $3,484.52 in cash and the appellants' assumption of the mortgage. The ranch was transferred to the asserted owners of the city property and by them to the respondent, instead of to his principal. This action
is for recovery of the ranch. Held: Broker is not liable as there was no
fiduciary relationship between the parties; appellants' investigations precluded their relying on respondent's statements; the appellants received
what they bargained for; and the broker is privileged to make such misrepresentations in bargaining as are permitted the principal. Buckley v.
Hatupin, 198 Wash. 543, 89 P. (2d) 212 (1939).
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Appellants' contention that respondent was their agent was summarily
dismissed, and the decision then rests upon the determination of the
question whether the respondent was liable for his fraudulent representation despite the absence of any fiduciary relation. The court held that
because of appellants' independent investigations "any false statements
made by respondent were not relied upon by appellants." This would be
uncontrovertibly true were the misrepresentations as to the value of the
property, all appellants' investigations being devoted to ascertaining that
value. The misrepresentations, however, were as to the price asked by
the owner, and all investigations begun by appellants with a view to
approaching the owner concerning the price were blocked by respondent.
The broker should not be heard to say that by giving credit to his false
and fraudulent statements, the purchaser must be held to have been
cheated and defrauded as a result of his own negligence and credulity.
Stevens v. Reilly, 56 Okla. 455, 156 Pac. 157 (1916). Appellants' reliance
upon the misrepresentations seems sufficiently proved by the fact that
he paid the price quoted by respondent, there being a general assumption,
"that in the usual course of human affairs, purchasers do not pay the
higher in preference to the lower price." Estes v. Crosby, 171 Wis. 73, 175
N. W. 933, 8 A. L. R. 1383 (1920). It follows that the court could well have
found that appellant did rely on respondent's misrepresentations.
The court found that injury, another requisite to an action in fraud,
was lacking because appellants received what they bargained for. The
fact that appellants got value is not conclusive that they received no injury.
Hindle v. Holcomb, 34 Wash. 336, 75 Pac. 873 (1904). The respondent's
principal asked and received a certain sum. The amount above that sum
is thus an extraction from the appellants of an amount unnecessary to
close the bargain and is a palpable injury to that extent. Lear v. Bawden,
75 Colo. 385, 225 Pac. 831 (1924).
The decision in the instant case states that the broker was privileged to
make misrepresentations as to the price demanded by his principal, and
that therefore even if they were relied upon to the injury of the appellants, they were not actionable. The authorities relied upon are REsTATE7VAN=, AGENCY (1933) § 348 (seller's talk); Sanders v. Stevens, 23 Ariz. 370,
203 Pac. 1083 (1922); Bradley v. Oviatt, 86 Conn. 63, 84 Atl. 321 (1912), 42
L. R. A. (N. s.) 828 (1913). Directly opposing this line of authorities is one
holding that misrepresentations as to the lowest sum an agent's principal
would take are not mere statements of opinion, but relate to facts calculated to influence a buyer, and on which he has a right to rely. Hokanson
v. Oatman, 165 Mich. 512, 131 N. W. 111 (1911); Booker v. Pelkey, 173 Wis.
24, 180 N. W. 132 (1920). To the same effect on analagous facts is Cook
v. Skinner, 50 Wash. 317, 97 Pac. 234 (1908), which was not cited to the
court in any of the briefs of counsel.
A sound intermediate position is adopted by Kentucky. A broker is held
for misrepresentation of the owner's price only when he has used fraud
or artifice to prevent the purchaser from inquiring or investigating whether
the property.may be bought for a less price. Kice v. Porter,21 Ky. L. IL
871, 53 S. W. 285 (1899). In the instant case the respondent dissuaded the
appellants from making such investigation. It is submitted that either
by following the previous Washington decision of Cook v. Skinner, supra,
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or by applying the Kentucky rule the injury to the appellants could have
been redressed and a seemingly unconscionable result avoided.
H. J. D.
SALES-EXPRESS WARRANTY. When the plaintiff purchased his Plymouth
automobile from the dealer he saw pictures of a sedan which had been
overturned safely day after day at the Chicago World's Fair, and he read
written advertising matter stressing the all-steel body. Both the pictures
and the reading matter were published by the defendant, Plymouth Motor
Corporation. Subsequently, the body of the plaintiff's car was badly
smashed when it overturned rounding a slippery curve. Plaintiff recovered
damages for injuries to himself and to the car. Held: Reversed and plaintiff's cause dismissed. The representation that a skilled driver can overturn a Plymouth on a smooth course does not warrant that the plaintiff
can spill his own car into a cow pasture without smashing the body.
Murphy v. Plymouth Motor Corporation, 103 Wash. Dec. 155, 100 P. (2d)
30 (1940).
In Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. (2d) 409 (1932), 88
A. L. R. 527 (1934), a purchaser recovered from the manufacturer on the
theory of an express warranty contained in advertising matter, despite
the absence of privity. The vast majority of courts still hold privity an
essential element in these actions (Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 15 F.
S.upp. 57 (N. D. Ill., 1936) ("The Baxter case stands alone."), af'd, 89 F.
(2d) 889, 111 A. L. R. 1239 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937)), unless a "dangerous"
tort case can be established. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y.
382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916). The Uniform Sales Act (Rsm. REV. STAT. §
5836-12) is in accord with the majority on this issue, for in declaring that
any affirmation of fact promoting reliance is an express warranty, it uses
the words buyer and seller. Inasmuch as it tends to discourage false and
misleading advertising, the decision in the Baxter case seems to have
justifiably expanded the statutory purpose by extension to manufacturers.
See Comment (1932) 7 WAsH. L. REv. 351; Comment (1933) 33 COL. L. REV.
868; Comment (1933) 18 Coau. L. Q. 445; Note (1932) 81 PENN. L. REv. 94.
Since the abolition of a privity requirement was an innovation in this
field of ex contractu actions, it seems proper that the instant case should
require plaintiffs to show clearly "an affirmation of fact" which has been
breached. In the Baxter case, defendant Ford Motor Co. had advertised,
"the windshield . . . will not fly or shatter under the hardest impact."
When the plaintiff lost his eye from sprayed glass after a rock hit the
windshield, the falsity of this representation, and the fact that the representation obviously covered such an injury permitted a recovery upon
an express warranty. Recovery against a manufacturer has been denied,
however, under an advertisement stating, "this glass is the best available
protection against flying particles," because of the plaintiff's inability to
show that another type of glass was a "better protection". Rachlin v.
Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F. (2d) 597 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) (The court
did not pass on the privity requirement, but held that even if privity is not
essential, still no breach of warranty could be found). Compare the construction in Ireland v. Liggett Co., 243 Mass. 243, 137 N. E. 371 (1922),
where, in an action against the immediate seller with whom the buyer had
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privity, it was held that an express warranty, "cold cream is pure and
healthful", was breached by the presence of a foreign substance. Although
it is probable that the Plymouth Co. subjectively intended purchasers to
believe the body smash-proof, the court in the case apparently requires
proof of a representation that explicitly negatives the defect alleged by
the plaintiff.
While the term implied warranty is found in the instant case, the
litigation seems to involve only an alleged express warranty. Neither
the Baxter case nor the present case contain any facts which would justify
the pleading or discussion of an implied warranty of quality. Possibly
the court used the term implied warranty to mean a representation of
fact, which, when followed by reliance, is given the effect of a promise
irrespective of a promissory intent. Huntington v. Lombard, 22 Wash. 202,
60 Pac. 414 (1900) (prior to enactment of Sales Act); Brennan & Cohen
v. Nolan Laundry Co., 209 Iowa 922, 229 N. W. 321 (1930).
This strict application of the Baxter rule affords advertisers a reasonable leeway in what they can safely assert. Moreover, the opposite result
in the present case would encourage the litigation of in-founded claims.
R. A. P.
WT1ssEs-RIGHT TO IMPEACH ONE'S OWN WITNESS-PRIOR INCONSISTENT
STATEmNTs. In a prosecution for statutory rape, the child allegedly assaulted, testifying as a witness for the state, denied having had sexual
intercourse with the appellant. The prosecuting attorney, taken by surprise, introduced over appellant's objection, a prior inconsistent statement
for the purpose of impeaching her credibility. Held: When a party calling
a witness is taken by surprise by reason of affirmative testimony prejudicial to the interests of the party calling the witness, his prior contradictory statements may be shown for the purpose of affecting his credibility. State v. Thomas, 101 Wash. Dec. 258, 95 P. (2d) 1036 (1939).
As a general rule, a party who is surprised by unfavorable testimony
given by his own witness may interrogate the witness concerning prior
inconsistent statements made by him. The two requisites for impeaching
one's own witness are: (1) surprise, and (2) affirmatively prejudicial
testimony. State v. Bossio, 136 Wash. 232, 239 Pac. 553 (1925); Note (1931)
74 A. L. M 1042; 283. C. L. 644; 70 C. J. 1043.
These essential elements were found by the court in allowing impeachment in the instant case, as well as in Burger v. Taxicab Motor Co., 66
Wash. 676, 120 Pac. 519 (1912); State v. Kellogg, 91 Wash. 665, 158 Pac. 344
(1916); Blystone v. Walla Walla Valley Ry. Co., 97 Wash. 46, 165 Pac. 1049
(1917); State v. Fry, 169 Wash. 313, 13 P. (2d) 491 (1932). The cases in
which the requirements were found to be lacking are represented by
State v. Simmons, 52 Wash. 132, 100 Pac. 269 (1909), in which the court
refused to'permit the defendant to impeach his own witness because the
witness testified to a mere negative and "had he been ever so successfully
impeached, the only effect would be to destroy testimony which was in itself
worthless." Cf. State v. Catsampas,62 Wash. 70, 112 Pac. 1116 (1911); Ferris
v. Todd, 124 Wash. 643, 215 Pac. 54 (1923); State v. Bossio, 136 Wash. 232,
239 Pac. 553 (1925); State v. Lloyd, 138 Wash. 8,244 Pac. 130 (1926); State
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v. Delaney, 161 Wash. 614, 297 Pac. 208 (1931) ; State v. Stephens, 116 La. 36,
40 So. 523 (1906); Arine v. United States, 10 F. (2d) 778 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926).
In the Bossio case, it is true that the prosecuting attorney disclaimed surprise, but a critical reading of the case as a whole will disclose that the
court would have refused to permit impeachment irrespective of surprise.
The tendency in Washington seems to be to construe the rule strictly,
allowing impeachment only when the effect of the adverse testimony is
definitely prejudicial to the party calling him, as in the instant case, and
excluding it where the witness merely fails to give beneficial testimony.
The adverse testimony must be affirmative to be prejudicial. State v. Fry,
supra; Ferris v. Todd, supra. The difficulty with this rule lies in determining just what is affirmative testimony, since a denial of certain material
facts may be negative in form but affirmatively prejudicial in effect, as
in the Thomas case. In State v. Fry, supra, cited in the instant case and
with a substantially similar factual situation, the court said that testimony
that the act charged did not occur, though in form in the negative, was in
effect in the affirmative. This same distinction was recognized in State
v. Kellogg, supra, where the court permitted impeachment, but as contrasted with the present case, it would seem that the rule was there
misapplied. In the Kellogg case, the issue was the chastity of the prosecuting witness, and the denial of intercourse with her by this particular
witness did not constitute a negation of unchastity. In the Thomas case,
the issue was the fact of intercourse between this witness and the defendant, and the witness' denial negatived a material issue. In both
cases, there was negative testimony of a positive fact, but in the Kellogg
case, it was not affirmatively prejudicial, while in the Thomas case, it was.
According to the Washington interpretation of the rule, it is the substance of the testimony and not its mere form that is determinative. If
the calling party claims surprise, and the unexpected testimony is harmful,
the court will permit impeachment, regardless of the form in which the
statement was made.
J. S. A.

